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said before, I have no claim to be called a pragmatist. I am even hopeful that his clear statement of instinctive propensity *versus* logical verification as the alternatives will help convert some non-pragmatists to my account of knowledge involving past events.

Enumeration of the things needful to assume in framing an effective plan of action is an undoubted part of the process. But it is a hypothetical enumeration. Part of the operation of intelligent formation of a plan of action is to note what the needs of the situation are. But the needs of an agent can themselves be judiciously estimated only in connection with other matters which enter into the situation along with the agent. To isolate the needs or propensities of the agent and regard them as grounds of belief in the validity of meaning seems to be the essence of subjectivism. And when the plan of action is framed it is still tentative. It is verified or condemned by its consequences. A propensity without doubt suggests a certain view and plan: when employed in connection with environmental factors it makes a view or plan worthy of acceptance *for trial*, acceptance as a working hypothesis. Beyond this point, the notion that a propensity, however practically irresistible, or an assumption, however instinctive—if there be such things apart from habit—warrants belief that a meaning is valid commits us to a subjectivism which is, to my mind, the most seriously objectionable thing in idealism.

It is Mr. Lovejoy, it seems to me, who is committed to a subjective pragmatism.

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THE DIFFERENTIATING PRINCIPLE OF RELIGION

THE most common conception of religion that has formed the basis of theological definition is that which generalizes man's total outlook upon the world as a whole. This view, which assumes that the sphere of religion and the world are commensurable, is chargeable to a deeply rooted fear that some vital element, essential to the fulness of spiritual experience, may be omitted if religion is defined exclusively in any specific phase of devotional activity. The complexity of the religious consciousness appears to prohibit any exemption in the spiritual sphere; which is to say, religion insists upon being as inclusive as life itself. Consequently, suspicion or unpopularity is usually associated with attempts at simplification, such as basing religion fundamentally in emotion, or belief, or will or any single element for which priority is claimed. The widest and most

inclusive view of the world in its totality and completeness is the conception which has met with the greatest favor in the minds of those to whom we owe our standardized definitions.

But this determination to maintain a religious monopoly upon the universe has strained to the breaking point our intellectual conscientiousness; for an average amount of reflection will make it clear that those who have sought to define the nature of religion specifically in terms of fear, or wonder, or reverence, or love, or any other simple element, though they have failed in exactness, have been at any rate upon the right track, since religion and life can not be said to coalesce at all points and the object of definition is differentiation. That which is richest in universality is proportionately poorer in elucidation.

In order to survey the extent of the religious field and estimate how wide a realm lies under spiritual control, we should begin by determining the fixed center of spiritual gravity, so to speak, for the circumference is an ever-shifting circle. It is impossible to measure the boundaries of the religious realm once for all, but it is possible and necessary to determine the principle that obtains in all true religion. The world of human experience is an ever-widening one and it is a natural error to conceive the province of religion as constantly enlarging to keep pace with this expansion, but in reality the reverse is true. Modern thought is fully alive to the need of a practical evaluation of spiritual reals, an evaluation which is bound to reduce the scope of religious activities to decidedly narrow, and more and more exclusive boundaries. In other words, the world is becoming less quantitatively spiritual than ever before, and this fact suggests the need of establishing more precisely than has yet been done with any degree of confidence the nature of the differentiating principle which marks off the specific realm of genuine religion from other parts of existence.

Let me recall some ways in which religion has been narrowed down. The Platonic inheritance of the Good, the True and the Beautiful, appropriated by Christianity as permanent apartments of the religious sphere, is being annulled and, in fact, is already practically spent. The fields of art, truth (philosophic)—not to mention science—have long overpast the boundaries of religious control. In the beginning, science was subdued somehow, though awkwardly, art was more gracefully submissive, and truth (*i.e.*, Truth *semel pro semper*) became more or less the faithful handmaid of theology; and this religious inclusiveness went along with the general cosmic idea of Deity whose omnipotent sway knew no bounds or limitations. This traditional all-embracing view, however, has

been conspicuously modified in recent years. Science pursues a free course, art is independent of religious control, truth already has gained a large degree of functional liberty, and morals, always restless and impatient of spiritual restraint, would seem to be striving to throw off the religious yoke and attain the freedom which science enjoys.

Without debating the relative merits of the good, the true, the beautiful and the dynamic to achieve independence in their respective fields, it is obvious that religion must forego her claim of absolute inclusiveness and recognize legitimate limitations. And if the signs of the times are truly discerned, one may conclude that religion, herself, is not loth to surrender the idea of cosmic universality in exchange for one that is more intensive and less abstract.

Such a radical tendency or change in spiritual activities has been brought about in the following way. Before the study of comparative religion had become an accepted part of Christian apologetic—in relatively recent times—it was the custom to classify world religions according to a general standard as true or false, Christianity in some form or other being set off against all other systems of faith as *the* truth, the rival beliefs being gauged as false, or at any rate merely more or less true—certainly less. To-day, however, this formal system of classification has been discarded, and we are inclined, quite universally, to formulate a system of classification upon a scale of the better and the worse or according to a principle of practical value. Instead of rating the so-called world religions outside Christianity as though they were not religions at all, in the strict sense of the word, since they are not wholly true, we are willing to admit that non-Christian beliefs and practises are expressive of religion, *quâ* religion, only not so good, not so high and pure, not so valuable, functionally, as the dominant faith of the world to-day.

This change of mind testifies to an important modification of our idea of the nature of religion, the essence of which is thought to inhere in that which constitutes value for moral and spiritual life. Religious practise is no longer judged with reference to the truth of a belief simply, but is determined by a criterion of value or worth; and belief, itself, is expressed more and more in terms of a practical nature. All the world cults, therefore, are recognized for what they are worth; and all successful missionary efforts are based upon this recognition. Consequently we speak of one form of religion as better than another or a particular element as less good than another; the criterion of truth is relegated to second place and the principle of value or goodness prevails. The result is that religion becomes exclusive inasmuch as she limits herself to that which is the highest

and best, and in the interest of the greater values she eliminates the lesser and irrelevant. What a departure, then, from the position of thinkers in the time of Mill who wrote, "If religion, or any particular form of it is true, its usefulness follows without any other proof."¹

To realize that the best religion must inevitably become increasingly finite, *i.e.*, restricted in scope and limited in function, may appear at first to be radically opposed to the commonly cherished ideal of religion's primacy and the catholicity of spiritual aims. But is this the case? I venture to suggest that the reverse is true. Can not religion, as a palpable ideal and an actual driving force, succeed better in the dissemination and conservation of the good by an intensification of power through the limitation of her range?

The problem, therefore, that arises is this: If religion in the only form now acceptable to us is only a part of life and no longer the constitutive principle of the whole, what part does she concentrate upon and in? Such a question is the direct consequent of our departure from a crumbling traditional position which accepted or rejected spiritual contributions according to a principal of standardized truth. In other words, inasmuch as we now employ various practical gauges of value to test the relevancy of religious ideals to moral and spiritual ends, we are bound to consider religion from the exclusive point of view, and ask: What elements have lost their original spiritual value? or, What factors should be discarded as never having had sufficient genuine spiritual worth to justify their survival? That is to say, we are narrowing down the circle of the religious sphere, and leaving more and more of life to the non-religious field. The question remains then: What survivals are essential for spiritual progress?

Before I attempt to state my thesis in answer to this problem, let me emphasize again the necessity of the factor of religious elimination. The primary tendency or instinct of organisms to develop from the simple to the complex, from the general to the particular, from the single to the plural is coördinate with a law of progress which organizes by a process of elimination. Steps of the advance can usually be discerned by the lopping off of valueless survivals. The broader syntheses through nature's analytical working, comparison, selection, and ever-renewed coördination, are resolved into more centralized and richer organizations. And human nature, likewise, refines itself by specification. Along with the process of differentiation, integral contractions take place wherein the less good gives way to the better as values are estimated according to the purposive workings of the organism. Man realizes himself more per-

¹ Cf. *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 69.

fectly, *i.e.*, successfully, as he becomes acquainted with himself compositely, in detail, aware of mixed and combating motives, varied and crossed sentiments, of the pluralistic situation within himself. But to advance means to refine, *i.e.*, to judge, choose and discard. In the end, consciousness, as a self-principle, is more and more exclusive in relation to the ever-increasing richness of experience; and character necessitates constant revaluation and reconstruction in order to maintain its intrinsic worth.

The religious man attains the highest unity, not at the sacrifice of the elemental multiplicity of experience, but at the sacrifice of what he is unwilling to identify with himself; he is more concretely an individual, not at the expense of experimental experience, but at the cost of what he refuses to incorporate into himself; he is a more unique personality, not because appreciations are limited or pioneer adventures are shirked, but on account of his persistent determination to ally himself only with the highest and best things in the world. The religious man, in other words, is intensively and integrally good because he dispenses with the less worthy in order to concentrate upon that which alone is worth the greatest effort. In brief, the best man is *specifically* good; there is an originality in his goodness, and a manifest moral partiality in his estimate and appropriation of values. If "he sets his teeth" in the not-self of his environment, he will not bite off, or rather, he will not swallow, what the best of him can not digest and assimilate properly.

Such a specification of virtue is the inevitable result of moral activities within the particular station of the individual. No one person can have a monopoly of the virtues; and if it were possible, he would be able to exercise but those which pertained to his own peculiar office and vocation. Consequently we see the soldier conspicuous for courage, the economist for prudence, the student for intellectual integrity, the man of average ability for temperance, the prophet for spiritual insight, the priest for piety and so on. A harmony of all the virtues, coördinated and organized, such as Plato delineated in the *Phædrus* under the picture of the charioteer who drove the passions courageously and prudently is practically obsolete as an ideal because of the unreal abstractions involved in the conception. The *real* man exercises and perfects only those virtues which are applicable to his own personal situation. It may be concluded, then, that personality grows and is shaped according as it excludes all factors which contribute nothing to, or would detract from, the dominant purpose controlling specific self-realization.

If this brief sketch of the extension and intension of human personality is true in the main, may we not unhesitatingly believe that the

progress of religion will follow much the same lines? Some religious material will be dropped naturally from time to time as it is outgrown and outworn, and the rules of this elimination will be subject to a principle of discrimination. What this principle is, is exactly the subject of our enquiry. When we see that one religion excels another, that certain elements are obviously more valuable than others, and that many survivals have become worthless and must accordingly be dispensed with as irrelevant or incompatible with the more important factors, then the problem arises: What is the standard gauge? It is the answer to this question which will nicely determine the exact field of religion.

Let us see what actual signs point to the growing exclusiveness of religion, in what way the secular realm is being enlarged for greater gain to that which constitutes the essential quality of spiritual life. For example, then, what we shall eat, what we shall drink, what we shall wear, how we shall plant our fields, how we shall build our temples, what we shall teach, what books shall be written and the thousand and one details over which in the past religion exercised and exorcised her autocratic say are now excluded from the province of the best religious faith and practise. We have offered the purely material and mechanical field to science that religion may gain the more freedom in her own realm; we have allowed the philosopher freer play in the realm of truth, permitted art a greater liberty in the region of the beautiful, surrendered to psychology the secrets of our inner life, to sociology matters of organization, to the state, matters of law—all that religion may enrich herself more speedily after her special liking. We have sold all, or almost all, we possess for the one jewel of great price; we pay the greater price to Cæsar that God may receive the purer treasure. If, then, religion abandons much of her wonder to philosophy and much of her miracle to science and many personal mysteries to psychology, and surrenders her beauty largely to art, her organization and statutes to sociology and economics, the importance of what she refuses to relinquish is quite obvious.

The answer now to our problem is not difficult to see; but do we realize what this means or is going to mean to the future of religion? The final stronghold of religion being *moral life*, toward which end all present religious movements are conspicuously pointing, is this an inspiring sign of the times or a weakness in modern spirituality? I venture to state that this pressure upon and centralizing in moralities is beyond praise and must prove a source of unlooked-for hope in these troublous times; for the moral-religious merger means a new vision of human character transcending the present form of our

ethos and all out of proportion with its development hitherto, as well as a fresh glory for religion in bringing heaven down to earth.

It is, therefore, in this special field, morality in its widest connotation, that we see religion crowding back and the portent is momentous. And just here in spite of the dangerous forces which have assaulted the fair moral stature of humanity, if the most trustworthy signs of the times are to be accredited, religion appears to be easily holding her own. She can not and will not permit a trade or sport in the moral nature of mankind. We have sadly learned *nostro periculo* that a large measure of personality is not equivalent with goodness. Individual self-realization or community-realization is attended with the greatest dangers of distortion when divorced from spiritual control. The horrible fact of dæmonic personality is only too well disclosed by the ruthlessness of "civilized" warfare. We have beheld with moral terror the dispassionate elimination of all that unfits a person for the achievement of his ends and the common ends of his fellows regardless of a scale of values which should determine the better and the worse, resulting, not simply in the crime of a renaissance of barbaric civilization, but in something more intolerable, namely, the felonious act of producing the personality of the savage—and not the mere savage, unintellectual and cruel, rather the savage as an ideal, as the amoral apotheosis of force.

Strange as it may sound, we must admit that the incorrigible enemies of peace are idealists. Ideals, when genuine, are intimate, individualistic and unique; which is to say, ideals are nothing if not a matter of singular personality. They are the stuff that is naturally radical and wilful. Hence the danger lies exactly here: the fact that it is the instinctive tendency, the whim, the spirit of an ideal to have its fling, to play truant, to adventure into romance, to forsake the familiar in search of the unfamiliar in ways remote. In other words, ideals are the flower of moral abstractions; they sprout and flourish upon a stock of truth which grows out of the philosophic or metaphysical mind; they delight an ambitious imagination with an intoxicating fragrance until nothing can withstand them—nothing but the hard facts of life and the opposition of other ideals. It follows, then, that because of the superior force of idealistic energies they require the special discipline of the most practical judgments of value that religion can formulate, or character is ruined.

To supply this standard of personal worth is the rationale of religion. And such is the moral emergency of the present-day world. It is exactly at this point and with this definite end in view that religion enters the social conflict. All of which suggests the differentiating feature of religion, namely, moral interests. In this field,

religion must continue to exercise and maintain her peculiar power, to magnetize the moral compass, to spiritualize ideals, to gauge the perfect measure of the right. Morality is the child, religion the parent; but forever "the child is father to the man."

The antithesis of the Christian standard, which I have tried to do justice to, along modern lines, is that of the orthodox Pharisee, a product of the inclusiveness of later Judaism with its rigid law. The wonderful moral impetus given to Old Testament religion by the prophetic analysis of the better and the worse, of the good and the evil, of the righteous and the wicked, was neutralized and blocked by this type of religious inclusiveness. The curious anomaly of the Pharisee, *viz.*, a separateness from worldliness combined with an attempt to bring all of life completely within the compass of the Law, presents a picture of religious inclusion. This "separateness" from the world was a *contradictio in adjecto* to the rule of life professed and a shallow unreality. The truth of the matter is that the Pharisees identified worldliness after all with religion. And this was precisely the trouble. His religion was too inclusive; it had no distinct character which permitted the functioning of comparative values; so that there was no better and worse, no greater commandment, in his conception of moral and spiritual life. All was constituted on the same level, the *dead* level, so to speak.

It is in this sense that modern religion may be characterized as finite; because of a specialization in moralities. If we are willing to withdraw from other fields, it is because there is one pearl of great price which absorbs all our enthusiasm; and though this fine spiritual exclusiveness may involve the abandonment of some long-cherished cosmic beliefs and the difficult sacrifice of many dear hopes, and though haunting clouds of darkness may hover over the unexplored ground where ultimately religion and morals meet, still no truly loving heart need fear self-deception when the spirit of Christ manifest in any good action whatsoever is identified with Christ himself. For love is the most accurate moral compass with which human nature is endowed.

In this highly specialized and highly secularized world of ours—rightly so—our alarm at the loss of much that had been thought to belong indissolubly to religion, which is now being withheld from her without protest, may be assuaged by recollecting that these same limitations of religion will intensify her power. This is well illustrated in the history of Israel, Christianity in the making, for the Hebrews were one of the most narrow-minded nations, intellectually, that the world has ever seen: they could not be compared favorably with the Egyptians for mechanical and industrial ability, nor with

the Phœnicians for commerce, nor with the Philistines for art, nor with the Assyrians for war, nor with the Babylonians for general versatility, nor with the Sumerians for literary originality, nor with the Greeks for philosophy, nor, we may add, with the Anglo-Saxons for science; but, nevertheless, they thought the more profoundly in religion and the more practically in morals.² All of which goes to show that an intensification of spiritual experience more than compensates for a want of general inclusiveness.

In conclusion, let me summarize the results of this enquiry. Some principle of differentiation is necessary to mark the proper sphere of religion since one of the most conspicuous signs of modern religion is the breaking up of the traditional religious hegemony that has so long prevailed over all departments of life. Religion also must make clear her distinctive character because the conditions of definition require a positive shrinking in extension and a reduction to more precise specification. The terms in which religious concepts are expressed may be the changing phases of life of successive generations, but the field of religious interest and action can not change. We are helped in marking out the boundaries of this permanent field by the successful tendency for specialization conspicuous to-day in all directions and approved by the best intelligence. And this, in respect to religious activities, is indubitably the field of moral interests and all that makes for righteousness in character and in nationality. Here lies the impregnable stronghold of the Kingdom. From whatever planes of activity religious forces withdraw, here the retreat must ultimately halt; and within these specific lines religion must forever exercise her control. What we are beginning, then, to see is this: religion not only subscribes to and sanctions the best morality, but moral character itself is religion objectified and realized.

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NASHOTAH, WIS.

INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLECT

IT is well known that certain words and terms make a greater appeal to the mind of the public than others. Psychologists are perhaps not to be included among the public, inasmuch as they, in common with all other scientists, are supposed to select their terms and not to allow themselves to be guided by ordinary usage. But try as one will, there are certain circumstances which rule over the fate

² Cf. Laura H. Wild: *The Evolution of the Hebrew People*, Part IV *passim*.